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ABSTRACT 
 
PAUL MICELI: Making Sense of the Past: Informational Order and Hindsight Judgments 
(Under the direction of Lawrence J. Sanna) 
 
Past research as explored the effects of receiving details leading up to an event in a 
logical, coherent fashion versus a random, fragmented fashion (e.g. Carroll & Korukina, 
1999), but no research has considered these effects for judgments of the past, such as the 
hindsight bias.  Also, no past research has looked at the hindsight bias when receiving 
outcome knowledge before, as opposed to after, learning details leading up to an event.  In 
this thesis, I examined the hypothesis that the order in which people receive details leading 
up to an event (Narrative Order: Logical vs. Random) and the order in which people receive 
outcome knowledge (Outcome Order: Before vs. After learning details leading up to an 
event) will affect people‘s judgments of that past event.  A significant interaction between 
Narrative Order and Outcome Order was found for hindsight judgments.  The implications of 
this finding are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
How do people make sense of past events, and does the way in which information is 
received make a difference?  Consider the example of September 11, 2001 (9/11), a date that 
will be forever burned into the minds of people across the U.S. and much of the world.  The 
massive scale and unexpected nature of the terrorist attacks led people to search for 
explanations.  Every American may have had his or her own opinion about the cause of the 
attacks and the appropriate response that the U.S. government should have taken.  
Information about the attacks was disseminated to the general public through various media 
outlets that constantly offered new developments and evidence to consider in our collective 
search for meaning.  Although most people searched for explanations, not everyone had the 
same perspective on the events of 9/11, either before or after the event occurred.  These 
varying perspectives could have profound effects on how people make sense of this and other 
events.  These issues are of focus in my thesis. 
 To understand these ideas further, consider what it might have been like from the 
perspective of a person in an intelligence agency, such as the Central Intelligence Agency 
(C.I.A.), prior to and after 9/11.  Part of the C.I.A.‘s job is to collect and process information 
about potential terrorist attacks in order to thwart them before they happen.  The C.I.A. 
collected many fragmented pieces of evidence that potentially warned of these attacks.  This 
scattered evidence even led to classified intelligence reports with titles such as ―Bin Ladin 
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Threatening to Attack US Aircraft [with antiaircraft missiles]‖ in June, 1998 and ―Bin Ladin 
Determined to Strike in the US‖ in August, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004, p. 342).  Unfortunately, the C.I.A. was not able to put all the 
relevant information together before the attacks occurred.  However, after the events of  9/11 
were already known, it became somewhat easier to put together the fragmented pieces of 
evidence they had collected earlier and to make sense of circumstances that led up to the 
event.  Not only could someone in this position tie the relevant bits of evidence together to 
tell a coherent story, ―connecting the dots‖ in hindsight, but a person in this position could 
also more easily weed out the bits of information that were irrelevant to the final outcome 
(i.e., terrorist attacks).   
 In contrast, consider another perspective that a person may have on the events of 
9/11, such as the generation of Americans for whom the events of 9/11 are now already well-
known.  This perspective may be illustrated by textbook descriptions of 9/11, such as the 
following in one of the most commonly used, current high-school textbooks, The American 
Promise (Roark et al., 2009, pp. 1171-1172): 
In the most deadly attack ever launched on American soil, nineteen terrorists hijacked 
four planes and flew three of them into the twin towers of New York City‘s World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; the fourth crashed in a field in 
Pennsylvania.  The hijackers were members of Osama bin Laden‘s Al Qaeda 
international terrorist network, some of whom had been living in the United States for 
several years… Islamic extremists were enraged by the spread of Western goods, 
culture, and values into the Muslim world.  Acting on a distorted interpretation of one 
of the world‘s great religions, bin Laden sought to rid the Middle East of Western 
influence and install puritanical Muslim control… [The] 9/11 terrorists and others 
who came after them saw the West, and especially the United States, as the evil 
source of their humiliation and the supporter of Israel‘s oppression of Palestinian 
Muslims.  In this account, in contrast with the previous example with the C.I.A., both 
the outcome and possible explanations for it are already known and presented 
together.  That is, this textbook description presents the information about 9/11 in a 
logical fashion, along with an explanation.  In short, receiving the information in this 
way likely will affect how people make sense of the event in a way that differs from 
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that of receiving some information beforehand and that could only be pieced together 
after the outcome is known (e.g., as in the case of the C.I.A.). 
 
 There are at least two key differences between the first, C.I.A., example and the 
second example of our current—and ―textbook‖—understanding of 9/11.  The first difference 
is the order in which each group received information regarding the outcome of the event.  
The C.I.A. received information about circumstances potentially leading to a terrorist attack 
before it happened–albeit in fragmented form–and then the outcome occurred later.  In other 
words, the C.I.A. received the outcome information after first receiving information leading 
up to that outcome.  But the information leading up to the outcome only made sense in 
hindsight.  In contrast, generations learning about 9/11 through the lens of a textbook have 
both the knowledge of the outcome and information about events that might have led up to it.  
These are both now well-known historical facts.  In short, order of outcome is one key 
difference:  In the first (C.I.A.) instance, outcome information is obtained after having 
received information about circumstances potentially leading to it, whereas in the second 
(textbook) instance, the outcome is known already (first), and one comes to understand it 
with the explanation that is already concurrently provided.    
The second key difference is the sequence in which information leading up to the 
event is received.  From the perspective of the C.I.A., information was received beforehand 
in a more random and fragmented way.  That is, they had been collecting random bits of 
information prior to 9/11, but they were not able to put it all together until the event occurred.  
In other words, this perspective is akin to putting together pieces of a puzzle without 
knowing exactly what the overall target image looks like until you are finished.  In contrast, 
current generations, like those understanding 9/11 from historical records or textbooks, 
received the relevant information about 9/11 in a logical, coherent way from the outset.  In 
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short, people can receive information about an event in a random fashion wherein the 
information is acquired in a very fragmented way, or they can receive this information in a 
logical fashion where it is already put together in a more structured and coherent way. 
Following the preceding ideas, my thesis examines whether the order in which people 
receive information about an event (―Logical Order‖ vs. ―Random Order‖) and the order in 
which people receive outcome information (―Outcome Before Event‖ vs. ―Outcome After 
Event‖) affects how they make sense  of events.  The actions on 9/11 led to a direct military 
response by the U.S. government.  The U.S. chose to begin a War in Afghanistan as a first 
response to a ―War on Terror.‖  Thus, the questions addressed in this thesis not only have 
theoretical implications but also strong implied implications for how people make important 
decisions.  In the following sections, I will review the literature on hindsight bias and 
informational order effects, two areas related to how people make sense of and understand 
events but which have not as of yet been considered together.
 CHAPTER 2 
HINDSIGHT BIAS 
 
The main dependent measure of interest in my thesis is the perceived inevitability of 
an outcome, a concept closely related to the hindsight bias, or ―knew it all along‖ effect.  
Fischhoff (1975) was the first to describe the hindsight bias in which people with knowledge 
of an event outcome mistakenly believe that, in foresight, they would have predicted that 
outcome.  They believe that the outcome was more inevitable after knowing that it actually 
occurred.  The hindsight bias can give people the impression of a clear understanding of the 
past, which may result in overconfidence or ―prevent[ing] us from learning anything‖ from 
past events or experiences (Fischhoff, 1982, p. 343). 
The hindsight bias is a robust phenomenon that has been identified in variety of 
different domains such as political elections (Sanna & Schwarz, 2003; Blank, Fischer, & 
Erdfelder, 2003), legal judgments (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995), medical diagnoses (Detmer, 
Fryback, & Gassner, 1978), and sporting events (Roese & Maniar, 1997; Leary, 1981).  The 
mechanism underlying the bias has to do with the way in which people mentally model 
events.  Having the added insight of outcome information allows people to update their 
mental models of an event – causing them to give more weight to previous information that 
affirms the outcome and less weight to previous information that is less relevant to the 
outcome (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990).  Therefore, outcome information biases old 
knowledge about an event, and this biasing results in a skewed view of the old knowledge 
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that is more likely to lead people to think that they would have ―known it all along‖ 
(Fischhoff, 1975, p. 298).  Almost all previous research on the hindsight bias has focused 
exclusively on presenting participants with evidence or information leading up to an event 
and then having them predict outcomes before the actual outcome is known and comparing 
this to judgments after the outcome is known.
 CHAPTER 3 
ORDER EFFECTS AND JUDGMENTS 
 
 There is extensive research that suggests the existence of an ―order effect,‖ or the 
phenomenon that the order that information is presented affects people‘s final judgments 
(Asch, 1946; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Zhang, Johnson, & Wang, 1998; Wang, Johnson, & 
Zhang, 2006).  Most of the previous research in this area has focused on the sequence of 
information leading up to a single decision.  No existing studies have examined the effect of 
receiving information after the outcome (as opposed to before).  Most research has shown 
order effects when the sequence of information is presented before the outcome, but even this 
research sometimes arrives at different conclusions.  Sense-making is multi-faceted, but one 
way to measure how we make sense of information is the weight that we put on information 
presented in a sequence.  Some studies have found a primacy effect (Dennis & Ahn, 2001; 
Yates & Curley, 1986), in which people give more weight to information early on in a 
sequence, while others have found a recency effect (Lopez, Shanks, Almaraz, & Fernandez, 
1998), in which people give more weight to information presented near the end of a 
sequence. 
Collins and Shanks (2002) replicated both primacy and recency effects and found that 
judgment frequency influenced these effects.  A recency effect was found when participants 
were probed for multiple judgments throughout the task, while a primacy effect was found 
when participants were only asked for an ultimate judgment at the end of the task.  These 
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results relate to the concepts of on-line versus memory-based judgments (Hastie & Park, 
1986).  If spontaneous judgments are made as information is processed (on-line), a recency 
effect is more likely, whereas if judgments are made based on information from memory 
(memory-based), a primacy effect is more likely.  These previously described contradictory 
effects illustrate the need for further research in this area in order to better understand this 
phenomenon, as well as to address the dearth of research in the domain of receiving outcome 
information either before or after the information leading up to the event.  For example, 
people receiving outcome knowledge before the information leading up to an event may 
exhibit more of this on-line processing while those receiving outcome knowledge after the 
information leading up to an event may exhibit this memory-based processing.  These 
differing forms of information processing affect sense-making and subsequently inevitability 
and hindsight judgments. 
There is also research that suggests that the coherence of the information, along with 
the general order of presentation, affects judgments.  This research shows differences when 
receiving information in a logical versus a random fashion.  For example, Carroll and 
Korukina (1999) examined the effects of text coherence on recall and metamemory 
judgments.  They found that narratives presented in a coherent, ordered context, as opposed 
to a disordered sequence, led to better recall and higher ratings of metamemory judgments 
(i.e. judgments about one‘s knowledge of their own memory processes).  Abele and Petzold 
(1998) found that participants made different attributions in an impression formation task 
when the information about a target person‘s occupation and behavior was presented either 
randomly or blocked together in a more logical way.  Therefore, varying the order in which 
information was presented changed how people made sense of, and subsequently made 
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attributions about, different people.  Therefore, receiving information leading up to an event 
in a logical versus a random fashion affects sense-making processes that contribute to how 
we understand and explain people and events. 
All of this research shows that the order in which information is presented can have 
profound effects on people‘s judgments and how we make sense of information.  
Informational order has been found to affect clinical judgments (Chapman, Bergus, & 
Elstein, 1996), juror decisions (Kassin, Reddy, &Tulloch, 1990), impression formation and 
ability attributions (Asch, 1946; Abele & Petzold, 1998; Greenlees, Dicks, Holder, & 
Thelwell, 2007), hypocrisy judgments (Barden, Rucker, & Petty, 2005), and tactical 
decisions (Zhang et al., 1998).  The present research will build on these previous findings and 
expand on them by considering new, yet common, ways of receiving information as well as 
by applying these different ways of receiving information to inevitability and hindsight 
judgments.
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
In this thesis, I examine several unique issues that expand on the previous hindsight 
and informational order effect literature.  I use a scenario that attempts to mirror, within an 
experimental setting, some of the different perspectives that people have after receiving 
information about an event and its outcome from different orders.  By drawing on the 
previously described literature on hindsight bias and order effects, I make predictions about 
the varying effects of informational order on hindsight bias.  In short, I attempt to model 
some of the issues involved in making sense of an event, like the 9/11 example of which I 
began this thesis, using a laboratory task. 
My main manipulation involves varying the order in which participants received 
information about the outcome of a fictional event.  The information leading up to an event 
outcome was given in either a random, fragmented order (―Random Order‖) or a more 
logical, coherent order (―Logical Order‖).  Additionally, participants received the outcome to 
this event after reading the information leading up to the event outcome (―Outcome After 
Event‖), before reading the information leading up to the event outcome (―Outcome Before 
Event‖– reflecting the textbook readers‘ perspective in the 9/11 example), or not at all (―No 
Outcome‖). 
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Hindsight Bias Predictions 
The inevitability of the event outcome will be measured as an index of hindsight bias.  
Figure 1 depicts my predictions for inevitability judgments in the respective conditions, as 
described in more detail below.  Other exploratory judgments are assessed to see if varying 
orders of information affect other judgments, and Need for Cognition is also examined as a 
possible moderator, but no specific predictions were made for any of these. 
 I predicted that participants who receive information leading up to an event in a 
logical fashion and then receive the outcome information (―Logical Order‖/‖Outcome After 
Event‖ condition) will show a moderate amount of hindsight bias, evidenced by inevitability 
ratings.  This condition is most similar to the usual hindsight bias paradigm.  I also predicted 
that participants who receive information leading up to an event in logical fashion but receive 
outcome information first (―Logical Order‖/‖Outcome Before Event‖ condition) will show a 
higher degree of hindsight bias, indexed by higher inevitability ratings, than the previously 
described condition (―usual paradigm‖).  This latter condition may be most similar to 
textbook readers‘ perspective of 9/11.  I believe that participants in this condition will show 
this greater degree of hindsight bias because people will be able to integrate the outcome 
information on-line; that is, as they receive details about the event (for a review see Hastie & 
Park, 1986).  This direct biasing of incoming information will make it even more difficult for 
participants to see the event turning out any other way. 
In contrast, I predicted that participants who receive information leading up to an 
event in a random fashion and then receive the outcome information (―Random 
Order‖/‖Outcome After Event‖ condition) will react in either of two ways.  On the one hand, 
these participants may show a lesser degree of hindsight bias, indexed by lower inevitability 
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ratings, than the usual paradigm.  For instance, this condition might be most similar to the 
C.I.A.‘s perspective on 9/11.  Participants may show a lesser degree of hindsight bias 
because the outcome will be harder to integrate into previous information because 
information leading up to the event is disordered and less coherent.  This may follow Carroll 
and Korukina‘s (1999) finding that people show better recall when reading coherent, 
logically ordered narratives as opposed to randomly ordered narratives.  Lesser hindsight bias 
in this condition could also result from motives to avoid blame or self-recrimination for not 
having foreseen the outcome coming (―I couldn‘t have known it all along‖). 
On the other hand, participants in this ―Random Order‖/‖Outcome After Event‖ 
condition could alternatively display greater hindsight bias, indexed by higher inevitability 
ratings.  That is, after event outcomes become known, people may experience a type of 
―revelation‖ when looking back on events leading up to it; people may, for example, find it 
easy to put together the fragmented pieces of evidence collected earlier and to make sense of 
circumstances that led up to the event.  For example, research on the ―Revelation Effect‖ 
(Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990) has shown that people are more likely to believe that they 
have previously seen a slowly revealed word than a word that appeared all at once, regardless 
of if they had actually seen or studied the word before.  Receiving the outcome information 
after the fragmented information leading up to event outcome could lead people to believe 
that they have seen (or foreseen, in this instance) the actual outcome.  Therefore, ―connecting 
the dots‖ in hindsight, or a retrospective sense-making process, may lead one to experience 
an even greater sense of inevitability (e.g., ―Now it all makes sense, and I should have seen it 
coming‖). 
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I did not make any specific prediction for participants who receive information 
leading up to an event in a random fashion but who receive outcome information first 
(―Random Order‖/‖Outcome Before Event‖ condition).  Finally, I included two control 
conditions, in which participants did not receive any outcome information (―Logical 
Order‖/‖No Outcome‖ and ―Random Order‖/‖No Outcome‖ conditions), for comparison 
purposes.  
Exploratory Judgments 
In addition to the main judgment of interest, hindsight bias as reflected by perceived 
inevitability of the outcome, there are other judgments that could be made.  These judgments 
can also shape people‘s overall impressions about the event and the subsequent actions taken 
in response to it.  A few of these judgments, specifically blame, risk, fairness, and general 
dispositional judgments about people involved in the event, were included in my thesis for 
exploratory purposes.
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
INITIAL (PILOT) RESEARCH 
 
An initial experiment was conducted in order to examine the potential effects of 
informational order on judgment.  To do this, a narrative was constructed describing four 
unrelated characters whose lives inexplicably cross paths.  The structure of the narrative was 
loosely based on popular movies such as Crash, Syriana, and Babel.  The narrative led to 
multiple outcomes involving various characters.  It was split into 16 paragraphs of equal 
length with each character having four paragraphs that exclusively followed their perspective 
of the story. 
Two versions of the narrative were created in order to vary the order in which 
participants received the information in the narrative.  The ―Logical Order‖ narrative 
followed a time-line sequence beginning with the earliest paragraph, which took place on 
early Wednesday morning, all the way to the final paragraph, which took place on late 
Saturday night.  The ―Random Order‖ narrative blocked each character‘s entire storyline into 
four paragraphs.  Each four paragraph block was then presented randomly to the participants.  
Additionally, the outcomes of the narrative were presented to participants before reading the 
narrative (―Outcome Before Event‖ condition), after reading the narrative (―Outcome After 
Event‖ condition), or not at all (―No Outcome‖ condition).  Therefore it was a 2 (Narrative 
Order) x 3 (Outcome Order) between-participants factorial design. 
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The results of this initial attempt shed some light on a potential problem, and, more 
importantly, pointed to crucial improvements for the main experiment, described next.  There 
was a marginally significant interaction between Narrative Order (―Logical Order‖ vs. 
―Random Order‖) and conditions with outcomes or no outcome (composite of ―Outcome 
Before Event‖ and ―Outcome After Event‖ vs. ―No Outcome‖), F(1,89) = 3.30, p = .07.  
Participants in the ―Random Order‖ conditions that received outcome information rated the 
overall narrative as having followed a more logical progression while participants in the 
―Logical Order‖ conditions that received outcome information rated the overall narrative as 
having followed a more random progression.  Therefore, being told the outcomes of the 
narrative greatly affected participants reported thoughts about the progression of the narrative 
and Narrative Order somewhat qualified this effect. 
 There were some interesting results in this pilot study, but the manipulations did not 
appear to be strong enough.  To rectify this issue, I modified the narrative and then pilot 
tested it in order to ensure the issue was corrected.  First, the new narrative includes only one 
ultimate outcome for the characters involved, as opposed to individual outcomes for each 
character.  This outcome involves all the relevant characters converging at the end of the 
narrative.  Secondly, it is 25% shorter than the previous narrative, and there are less 
characters overall in order to reduce confusion.  Lastly, the ―Random Order‖ version of the 
narrative was made by a complete randomization of the all the paragraphs, instead of 
blocking specific storylines or characters together.  These changes to the narrative were 
expected to strengthen the main manipulation between the ―Logical Order‖ and ―Random 
Order‖ versions of the narrative and counteract any interaction between the Narrative Order 
and the outcomes, as was found in the initial research. 
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 The results of this modification indicated that the changes were effective in making 
the manipulations stronger, and they all performed as intended.  There was no longer any 
interaction between Narrative Order and the conditions receiving the outcomes or no 
outcome, F(1,26) = 0.32, p = .57.  More specifically, participants in the ―Random Order‖ 
condition rated the progression of the narrative as following a more random progression (M = 
-3.13 on an 11-point bipolar Likert-type scale anchored at -5 ―very random” to +5 ―very 
logical”) than those in the ―Logical Order‖ condition (M = +1.53).  A one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) showed a significant difference between the two versions, F(1,28) = 
16.47, p < .001.  The new scenarios therefore corrected the issue from the initial research; the 
narrative now reflects a strong dichotomy between the ―Logical Order‖ and ―Random Order‖ 
conditions.  Thus, this new version was used in the main study.
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
MAIN STUDY 
 
 To summarize, my thesis addresses three main questions.  First, does the order in 
which people receive information leading up to an event (Narrative Order: Logical vs. 
Random) affect people‘s subsequent judgments about that particular event and the people 
involved in it?  Secondly, does the order in which people receive the outcome knowledge of 
an event (Outcome Order: Before Event vs. After Event) affect people‘s subsequent 
judgments about that particular event and the people involved in it?  Third, do Narrative 
Order and Outcome Order interact? 
For hindsight judgments, I predicted that participants who receive information 
leading up to an event in a logical fashion and then receive the outcome information 
(―Logical Order‖/‖Outcome After Event‖ condition) will show moderate inevitability ratings.  
This condition will also provide a comparison for the other conditions because it follows the 
usual paradigm often used in hindsight bias research.  I also predicted that participants who 
receive information leading up to an event in a logical fashion but receive outcome 
information first (―Logical Order‖/‖Outcome Before Event‖ condition) will show a higher 
degree of hindsight bias, or higher inevitability ratings, than this comparison condition.  In 
contrast, I predicted that participants who receive information leading up to an event in a 
random fashion and then receive the outcome information (―Random Order‖/‖Outcome After 
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Event‖ condition) will show either a lower or higher degree of hindsight bias, because of the 
two possibilities described earlier in the Introduction, than this comparison condition.  No 
explicit predictions were made for participants who receive information leading up to an 
event in a random fashion but receive outcome information first (―Random Order‖/‖Outcome 
Before Event‖). 
These hypotheses were tested in a laboratory experiment designed to mirror ways in 
which people acquire information about an event in real life.  After reading a fictional 
narrative, participants made various judgments about the outcome of the narrative and 
various characters in the narrative.  Moreover, other judgments (e.g., blame) and Need for 
Cognition were included for exploratory purposes. 
Method 
Participants 
186 introductory psychology students at UNC-CH participated in this experiment for 
course credit. 
Scenario 
 A narrative was constructed as a scenario for use in this experiment.  The narrative 
follows three distinct storylines about unrelated characters.  The storylines come together at 
the end of the narrative, resulting in one final outcome in which one of the characters, Tom 
Wright, is struck and killed by a cab driven by another one of the characters, Bob Gatwick.  
This outcome was given to participants before reading the narrative (―Outcome Before 
Event‖ condition), after reading the narrative (―Outcome After Event‖ condition), or not at 
all (―No Outcome‖ condition). 
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The narrative was split into 23 individual paragraphs, and each paragraph was 
additionally paired with a picture that matches the content of that paragraph (see Figure 2).  
Two versions of the narrative were used in the experiment.  The ―Logical Order‖ narrative is 
ordered following a time-line sequence beginning with the earliest paragraph, which takes 
place on early Wednesday morning, all the way to the final outcome, which takes place on 
late Friday night (see Figure 3).  The ―Random Order‖ narrative was a random ordering of 
the 23 paragraphs.  The narratives were presented to participants via computer using 
MediaLab software (Empirisoft, 2006).  Each individual paragraph and its corresponding 
picture were presented for at least ten seconds before participants manually pressed a button 
to move onto the next paragraph. 
Measures 
 After reading the narrative, participants completed dependent measures, also using 
MediaLab software.  Questions assessing inevitability judgments were asked first.  These 
questions presented participants with the stated outcome of the story (―Outcome Before 
Event‖ and ―Outcome After Event‖ conditions) or a possible outcome of the story (―No 
Outcome‖ condition) and then asked them to rate to what extent that outcome was probable, 
predictable, and likely.  Participants responded to these three questions using an 11-point 
bipolar scale from -5 to +5 anchored at ―very improbable” to ―very probable” (for the 
―probable‖ inevitability question; each anchor corresponds to the particular judgment asked 
in the question).  An additional inevitability judgment question in which participants rated 
the probability of the outcome from 0% to 100% was then asked. 
 Exploratory judgments were included.  These judgments assessed participants‘ 
attributions of blame to specific characters (no blame vs. full blame), participants‘ personal 
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feelings of risk associated with being hit by a car (no risk vs. risk), the fairness of the 
outcome (unfair vs. fair), and inferences about the behaviors of specific characters 
(dispositional vs. situational).  Manipulation checks were also asked concerning the order 
that the narrative was presented (logical vs. random), how much the overall narrative made 
sense (nonsensical vs. sensical), and the ease of recalling specific aspects of the narrative 
(easy vs. difficult).  These were also asked on 11-point bipolar scales. 
 Memory questions followed, asking participants to recall specific aspects of the 
narrative as well as implied connections from the narrative.  Examples of these questions 
include “What company did Bob Gatwick invest in?” and ―Who was Sean Agnello chasing”.  
Finally, the 18-item Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was 
administered at the end of the experiment. 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions following a 2 (Narrative 
Order: Random or Logical) x 3 (Outcome Order: Before Event, After Event, No Outcome) 
between-participants factorial design.  After participants finished reading the narrative on the 
computer, they then completed the inevitability judgments.  Next, all participants completed 
the questions concerning the exploratory judgments.  After that, there were questions 
assessing narrative order, degree of sense-making, and ease of recall.  The additional memory 
test questions followed.  Finally, participants completed the Need for Cognition scale.  
Lastly, all participants were debriefed and thanked.
  
 
CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Check: Logical vs. Random Order 
 Participants read the narrative in either logical or random order.  As anticipated, 
participants who read the narrative in logical order rated the narrative as following a more 
logical progression (M = 1.12, SD = 2.57) than those who read the narrative in random order 
(M = -3.20, SD = 1.81), F(1, 184) = 176.29, p < .001, supporting the effectiveness of this 
manipulation.  In addition, they rated the narrative as making more overall sense (M = 3.10, 
SD = 1.85) than those who read the narrative in random order (M = 0.91, SD = 2.77), F(1, 
184) = 39.91, p < .001.  They also rated it easier to recall specific details from the story (M = 
2.17, SD = 2.20) than those who read the narrative in random order (M = -0.03, SD = 2.57), 
F(1, 184) = 39.59, p < .001.  Therefore, the manipulation was successful in that participants 
who read the narrative in logical order found the narrative to follow a more logical 
progression, make more sense, and it was easier to recall specific details than those who read 
the narrative in random order. 
Inevitability Ratings 
 Inevitability ratings were used as an index of hindsight bias.  An identical pattern of 
results emerged for all three hindsight judgments (probable, predictable, and likely), so these 
ratings were averaged together to create an ―inevitability rating‖ (Cronbach‘s α = .71).  These 
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inevitability ratings were analyzed using a 2 (Narrative Order: Logical or Random) x 3 
(Outcome Order: Before Event, After Event, No Outcome) analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
Contrasts (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000) were used to compare means. 
There was a marginal main effect of Narrative Order, F(1, 184) = 3.11, p = .08, which 
was qualified by the hypothesized Narrative Order x Outcome Order interaction, F(2, 180) = 
4.13, p = .016 (see Figure 4).  As predicted, for participants who read the narrative in logical 
order, those receiving outcome information before (M = 2.87, SD = 1.52) viewed the 
outcome as more inevitable than those receiving outcome information after (M = 1.56, SD = 
1.88), t(180) = 2.59, p = .011.  This pattern is consistent with the idea that people more easily 
integrate incoming information (―on-line‖) in accordance with the already known outcome 
when they receive the outcome information first (Hastie & Park, 1986).  Additionally, 
participants who read the narrative in logical order viewed the outcome as more inevitable 
than those reading the narrative in random order (M = 1.61, SD = 2.35) when outcome 
information was presented first, t(180) = 2.49, p = .014.  This pattern is consistent with 
Carroll and Korukina‘s (1999) research demonstrating that text coherence affects recall and 
metamemory judgments. 
For participants who received the outcome information after, an opposite pattern 
emerged:   Specifically, participants reading the narrative in random order viewed the 
outcome as more inevitable (M = 2.23, SD = 2.21) than those reading the narrative in logical 
order (M = 1.56, SD = 1.88), though the contrast was nonsignificant, t(180) = 1.32, p = .188.  
At the outset, there were two possibilities for people reading the narrative in random order 
and receiving outcome information after:  on the one hand, people could view the outcome as 
less inevitable because of unforeseeability or motivational concerns (―I couldn‘t have known 
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it all along‖) or more inevitable because they are ―connecting the dots,‖ making sense of the 
outcome in hindsight, similar to the Revelation Effect (Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990).  My 
results lend more support to the latter possibility. 
It is also relevant to consider the comparison of participants receiving outcome 
information after to those not receiving any outcome information at all because this 
comparison is most similar to the comparisons made in previous hindsight bias research.  The 
overall pattern of comparisons is interesting because for participants who read the narrative 
in logical order, those receiving outcome information after viewed the outcome as less 
inevitable than those who did not receive outcome information (M = 2.42, SD = 1.36), t(180) 
= 1.70, p = .091, while for participants who read the narrative in random order, those 
receiving the outcome information after viewed the outcome as more inevitable than those 
who did not receive outcome information (M = 1.44, SD = 2.40), t(180) = 1.56, p = .121, 
though both contrasts did not reach significance. 
Finally, within the no outcome conditions, participants who read the narrative in 
logical order viewed the (predicted) outcome as more inevitable than those who read the 
narrative in random order, t(180) = 1.94, p = .055.  This pattern is, again, consistent with 
Carroll and Korukina‘s (1999) work on the effects of text coherence. 
Exploratory Judgments 
 Exploratory judgments were also analyzed using a 2 (Narrative Order: Logical or 
Random) x 2 (Outcome Order: Before Event or After Event) ANOVA.  The two no outcome 
conditions were omitted from these analyses because the exploratory judgments concerned 
judgments of an actual outcome and not a possible outcome, which was the case in these two 
conditions.  Only one judgment of possible interest, blame for the character Sean Agnello, 
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showed a main effect of Narrative Order, F(1, 122) = 12.70, p = .001, whereby those reading 
the narrative in logical order attributed more blame to Sean Agnello (M = 2.66, SD = 2.08) 
than those reading the narrative in random order (M = 0.97, SD = 3.11).  These results could 
be consistent with previous research on the Story Model for juror decision making 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1988).  However, no other exploratory judgments revealed any 
significant differences based on the experimental manipulations, so it is premature to make 
much of any of them.  Need for Cognition also did not produce any significant results in my 
thesis.
  
 
CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Three key questions regarding the order of information and hindsight bias were 
addressed in my thesis.  First, does the order in which people receive information leading up 
to an event (Narrative Order: Logical vs. Random) affect people‘s subsequent judgments 
about that particular event and the people involved in it?  Secondly, does the order in which 
people receive the outcome of an event (Outcome Order: Before Event vs. After Event) 
affect people‘s subsequent judgments about that particular event and the people involved in 
it?  Third, do Narrative Order and Outcome Order interact?  Results showed that Narrative 
Order and Outcome Order did, in fact, affect participants‘ judgments about the outcome of 
the narrative.  The predicted interaction between these two variables was also found.  
Following the hypotheses presented in Figure 1, participants who read the narrative in 
logical order but received the outcome information before viewed the outcome as more 
inevitable than those who read the narrative in logical order then received the outcome 
information after (comparison condition).  Additionally, those who read the narrative in 
random order then received the outcome information after also viewed the outcome as more 
inevitable than the comparison condition.  The following sections elaborate on possible 
explanations and implications of these findings as well as other key comparisons worth 
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noting in relation to the hindsight bias, general order effects, and exploratory judgments.  
Finally I suggest some future directions following from the present research. 
Implications for Hindsight Bias 
My thesis addressed two underrepresented areas in the hindsight bias literature.  First, 
the hindsight bias literature has focused almost exclusively on judgments for scenarios and 
events where people do not have any outcome information (e.g. ―No Outcome‖ conditions) 
or for judgments where they do have outcome information, but only after receiving 
information leading up to an event (e.g., ―Outcome After Event‖ conditions).  This current 
study expands on the previous literature by also introducing a third order in which people can 
receive outcome information: before receiving information leading up to an event (―Outcome 
Before Event‖).  The second underrepresented area in the literature deals with how the 
hindsight bias differs when we receive information in logical, coherent ways as opposed to 
random, fragmented ways.  The current study expands on the previous literature by 
presenting information leading up to an event in either a logical or random fashion. 
In order to understand the implications for the former underrepresented area, it is 
necessary to consider two key comparisons.  The first comparison is within those people who 
read the narrative in logical order.  As predicted, those people receiving outcome information 
before viewed the outcome as more inevitable than those receiving the outcome information 
after.  These results lend support for the idea that people receiving outcome information 
before can more easily integrate this outcome information ―on-line‖ into incoming 
information (see Hastie & Park, 1986).  This form of direct biasing of incoming information, 
in which people can emphasis outcome-consistent information and deemphasize outcome-
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inconsistent information, makes it even more difficult for people to see the event turning out 
any other way. 
The second key comparison involves comparing those people who received outcome 
information before reading the narrative to those who did not receive any outcome 
information because this type of ―Outcome‖ vs. ―No Outcome‖ comparison is the typical 
comparison made in previous hindsight bias research.  Within both these conditions, those 
reading the narrative in logical order viewed the outcome as more inevitable than those 
reading the narrative in random order.  This pattern, along with the findings that those 
reading the narrative in logical order found the narrative to make more overall sense and 
easier to recall specific details about the narrative than those reading the narrative in random 
order, are consistent with Carroll and Korukina‘s (1999) research indicating that text 
coherence affects recall and metamemory judgments. 
 In order to understand the implications for the second underrepresented area in the 
literature, logical or random narrative order, it is also necessary to consider two other key 
comparisons.  The first comparison is within those people who received the outcome 
information after reading the narrative.  Those people who read the narrative in random order 
viewed the outcome as more inevitable than those who read the narrative in logical order.  
These results lend support for the idea that people ―connect the dots‖ or make sense of the 
outcome in hindsight when they receive outcome information after reading the narrative.  
People might have experienced a type of ―revelation‖ after receiving the outcome that helps 
them to retrospectively make sense of the previously random information already presented 
to them.  This process might lead people to say ―Now it all makes sense, and I should have 
seen it coming.‖ 
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 The second key comparison involves comparing those people who received outcome 
information after reading the narrative to those who did not receive any outcome information 
at all because this comparison is the typical comparison made in previous hindsight bias 
research.  Here I speculate on the interesting pattern of results found in these conditions.  The 
conditions involving no outcome information can be thought of prospective, or trying to 
make sense of a future event, while the conditions involving receiving outcome information 
after can be thought of as retrospective, or trying to make sense of an event in the past.  Two 
opposing patterns emerged in the comparisons between those people who received outcome 
information after and those who did not receive any outcome information, depending on 
Narrative Order.  For people who read the narrative in logical order, those who received 
outcome information after viewed the outcome as less inevitable than those who did not 
receive outcome information.  Conversely, for people who read the narrative in random 
order, those who received outcome information after viewed the outcome as more inevitable 
than those who did not receive outcome information. 
The finding that people who read the narrative in logical order and received the 
outcome information after viewed the outcome as less inevitable than those who did not 
receive outcome information might be understood through the lens of the ―Propensity Effect‖ 
(Roese et al., 2006).  Previous research on this ―Propensity Effect‖ has shown that people can 
become more confident of an impending outcome than an already known outcome.  This 
same pattern exists here, where people viewed a possible outcome that might occur (―No 
Outcome‖ condition) as more inevitable than for an actual outcome that they know had 
occurred (―Outcome After Event‖ condition).  The simulation heuristic (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982), or the tendency to simulate or construct a mental image of a hypothetical 
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outcome, might explain this result.  Participants not receiving the outcome might construct 
multiple possible outcomes before knowing the actual outcome.  All these outcomes seem 
very plausible, and, when presented with one of these possible outcomes, they rate it as 
highly inevitable.  Conversely, those receiving the outcome after reading the narrative do not 
have the multiple possible outcomes; instead they only have the one given outcome.  
Accordingly, they rate the outcome as less inevitable (than those not receiving the outcome), 
unless it fully matches their best simulation. However, in this experiment participants were 
not asked if the outcome matched their expectations, simulations, or mental constructions.  
Therefore it is not known if the outcome was seen as surprising for those participants who 
read the narrative in logical order and received outcome information after.  Nonetheless, 
those who read the narrative in logical order but received no outcome information could view 
the outcome as more inevitable because of prospective sense-making processes, or using 
forward construction, in which they are more likely to construct multiple potential outcomes 
in order to make sense of a future event. 
The finding that people who read the narrative in random order and received the 
outcome information after viewed the outcome as more inevitable than those who did not 
receive outcome information  might be understood through the lens of the ―Revelation 
Effect‖ (Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990).  People who receive information leading up to an 
outcome in a random, fragmented fashion are similar to those who have a word slowly 
revealed to them.  Previous research on this ―Revelation Effect‖ has shown that people are 
more likely to think that they had previously seen a slowly revealed word than a word that 
appeared all at once, regardless of if they had actually seen or studied the word before.  In the 
current study, people who read the narrative in random order and received outcome 
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information after obtained information leading up to the outcome in a way that is much like 
the experience of the participants in the original ―Revelation Effect‖ studies.  Here, the 
outcome can be seen as just another piece of information that is slowly revealed in the puzzle 
that is the event.  Therefore, participants are more likely to think that they have previously 
seen (or foreseen, in this instance) this particular outcome, leading them to view the outcome 
as more inevitable than those not receiving outcome information.  This phenomenon can be 
thought of as a form of retrospective sense-making, in which participants receiving the 
outcome after reading the narrative reconstruct their idea of the outcome and the event, fully 
taking into account that they think they have previously foreseen that particular outcome.  
Those not receiving the outcome do not have this same ability to reconstruct the event or the 
outcome through these retrospective sense-making processes. 
 There is also an alternative explanation that may account for the discrepancies in this 
comparison between those people receiving outcome information after and those not 
receiving any outcome information.  Previous hindsight bias research has defined the bias as 
having higher inevitability ratings in conditions in which people receive outcome information 
compared to conditions in which people predict the inevitability of the outcome (e.g. ―No 
Outcome‖ condition).  Using this definition, this hindsight bias effect was found for those 
people who read the narrative in random order and received outcome information after, but a 
reverse hindsight bias effect was found for those who read the narrative in logical order and 
received outcome information after.  The reversal of the hindsight bias in this condition can 
be understood through the literature on surprising outcomes and the hindsight bias.  Highly 
surprisingly outcomes have been shown to eliminate or reverse the hindsight bias (Ofir & 
Mazursky, 1997).  These feelings of surprise cue people to the fact that the outcome was not 
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consistent with their expectations gained from the information presented about an event.  
This inconsistency thus leads people to rate a particular outcome as less inevitable when that 
outcome is surprising. 
 It is possible that those receiving the outcome after reading the narrative in logical 
order showed this reverse hindsight bias effect because the given outcome was highly 
surprising, or it did not fit well with their expectations for the event.  In other words, those 
participants in this condition were led to expect a certain outcome from the narrative in 
logical order, and the given outcome did not match this expectation.  The narrative in logical 
order was constructed, and validated through the manipulation check, to present a 
straightforward story leading to a particular outcome.  This type of narrative construction 
could lead participants through a close-minded thought process that focused their thinking on 
a narrow set of possible outcomes that followed from their interpretation of the narrative.  If 
the given outcome did not conform to this narrow selection of possible outcomes, then a 
reverse hindsight bias effect would be expected because the outcome would be highly 
surprising. 
 Conversely, those receiving the outcome after reading the narrative in random order 
would not be expected to show a reverse hindsight bias effect, according to this logic.  
Instead, as was shown in the current study, these participants should display the normal 
hindsight bias effect.  The narrative in random order was constructed to present a fragmented 
story not necessarily leading to a particular outcome.  This type of narrative construction 
could lead participants through an open-minded thought process that kept their thinking open 
to the possibility of multiple different outcomes.  Once they are given the actual outcome, it 
is not seen as highly surprisingly since they were open to multiple possibilities.  Thus the 
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normal hindsight bias effect, as seen in countless previous studies providing the outcome 
after reading the narrative, is expected in this instance.  A simple analogy can further 
illustrate this point.  Imagine two tree limbs.  One tree limb has multiple branches stemming 
outward from it while the other limb only has a couple branches.  The former limb represents 
those receiving the outcome after reading the narrative in random order in which there is an 
openness to possibilities and multiple potential outcomes, leaving a low chance of having a 
surprising outcome.  On the other hand, the latter limb, with its narrow selection of branches, 
represents those receiving the outcome after reading the narrative in logical order in which 
there is a closed-minded thought process, leaving a high chance of having a surprising 
outcome. 
 My thesis expanded on the hindsight bias literature by better addressing those two 
underrepresented areas.  Future research will further unpack the mechanisms underlying the 
effects found in these new areas.  
Implications for Order Effects 
 General order effects have been found in various domains, and, as described in the 
previous section, an order effect was found for hindsight judgments in the current study.  
This finding alone adds further evidence to the vast literature suggesting an order effect, but 
this research also expanded on the previous literature in two important ways.  First, the main 
addition to this literature is the extension of this order effect to outcome information 
presented before the information leading up to an event.  Most of the previous research has 
focused exclusively on a sequence of information leading up to a single outcome or decision.  
The new paradigm presented in the current study added another possibility for potential order 
effects based on receiving this outcome information before the other information leading up 
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to an event.  The results showed multiple mean differences between the usual paradigm 
(―Outcome After Event‖ conditions) and the new paradigm (―Outcome Before Event‖ 
conditions), successfully extending these order effects to include a new paradigm. 
Second, the current study expanded on the previous literature on text coherence.  
Participants read the narrative in either the logical, coherent order or the random, fragmented 
order.  Narrative Order greatly affected participants‘ perceptions of how much the narrative 
made sense and how easy it was to recall specific details about the narrative.  More 
importantly, these two different narratives affected how participants made sense of the 
outcome to the narrative and, as I‘ll describe in the following section, how they attributed 
blame to a character in the narrative based on the outcome.  An important conclusion from 
this research is that we should analyze exactly how people receive information leading up to 
an event (Narrative Order) as well as the order in which they receive outcome information 
(Outcome Order) in order to adequately surmise the sense-making processes that lead people 
to their judgments about an event. 
The previous literature has also shown potential moderators to the general 
informational order effects.  The personality trait Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984), or the degree to which people regularly engage in effortful cognitive activity, has 
been identified as one such potential moderator (Kassin, Reddy, &Tulloch, 1990).  Need for 
Cognition was measured in this study, but was not found to moderate any of the effects. 
Exploratory Judgments - Blame 
 Participants who read the narrative in logical order attributed more blame to the 
character Sean Agnello than those who read the narrative in random order.  These results can 
be understood through the lens of the Story Model.  Multiple studies on the Story Model 
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have shown that the order in which information about a criminal case is presented has a large 
effect on the mental stories that jurors construct during a trial (for a review, see Pennington 
& Hastie, 1993).  Jurors tend to agree more with evidence presented in ―Story Order‖, which 
preserves temporal and causal order of the evidence, as opposed to ―Witness Order‖, which 
does not preserve temporal and causal order of the evidence and instead presents evidence on 
a witness by witness basis (Pennington & Hastie, 1988).  The two different Narrative Orders 
in the present experiment map onto these two orders in the Story Model studies.  The 
―Logical Order‖ narrative resembles the ―Story Order‖, in that it preserves temporal and 
causal order.  The ―Random Order‖ narrative resembles the ―Witness Order‖, in that it does 
not preserve temporal and causal order.  In fact, the ―Random Order‖ condition goes beyond 
the ―Witness Order‖ by presenting participants with an even more fragmented view of the 
information. 
 In the narrative, the character Sean Agnello, in an ill-fated attempt at regaining his 
pride, forces a suspected drunk driver off the road.  The overall sequence of events leads to 
the unfortunate death of an innocent bystander.  The narrative was written to imply Sean 
Agnello played a large role in causing this death.  The results showed that those reading the 
―Logical Order‖, or ―Story Order‖, narrative attributed more blame to Sean Agnello for this 
death than those who read the ―Random Order‖ narrative.  The temporal and causal chain of 
events was necessary to understand Sean Agnello‘s role in the death.  Therefore, the Story 
Model would predict the same pattern of results because the ―Logical Order‖ narrative kept 
that temporal and causal chain intact, while the ―Random Order‖ narrative did not.  These 
findings lend further support for and extend the Story Model beyond courtroom judgments 
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into the more general realm of fictional narratives.  It also shows another example of how the 
order in which we receive information can affect how we make sense of an event.
  
 
CHAPTER 8 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 My thesis successfully expanded upon the literatures for the hindsight bias as well as 
for general order effects for judgments.  The results showed some promising findings, but 
future studies will have to address some of the potential explanations for the mechanisms 
underlying the results.  For instance, a future study could explore the idea of unexpected or 
surprising outcomes.  This current study did not ask participants how surprising the actual (or 
potential) outcome was to them.  As previously mentioned, the level of unexpectedness or 
surprise of the outcome could have driven some of the key mean differences found in my 
results.  A future study could address this limitation by not only asking participants to rate 
the unexpectedness of the outcome, but also by manipulating this dimension by using 
multiple different outcomes previously rated as high or low in unexpectedness. 
A further study could investigate the idea of closed-minded vs. open-minded thinking 
in regards to potential outcomes.  One alternative explanation for the mean differences 
between the two ―Outcome After Event‖ conditions centered around the idea that those who 
read the narrative in logical order were put into a more closed-minded thought process 
leading them to expect a smaller number of possible outcomes.  Alternatively, those who 
read the narrative in random order were put into a more open-minded thought process leading 
them to expect a larger number of possible outcomes.  Future research could address this 
37 
 
explanation by measuring closed-mindedness and open-mindedness or by directly 
manipulating these processes. 
Another study could more directly manipulate the retrospective and prospective 
sense-making processes described earlier.  The current study set up conditions (―Outcome 
Before Event‖ and ―No Outcome‖, respectively) meant to represent these opposing 
processes, but it did not manipulate these processes directly.   
 Although Need for Cognition did not moderate the effects, other individual 
differences may play a role in the mechanisms at work here.  Need for Closure (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994), or the desire to have definite knowledge about an issue and avoid 
uncertainty or confusion, and Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994), or a person‘s 
uncertainty to understand causal relationships in the social world, are two individual 
differences that might account for some of the results.  These concepts might relate to how 
people understand, process, and make sense of actual (or potential) outcomes.  Future 
research could measure these differences and include them in any subsequent analyses.
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Figure 1. Hindsight Bias Predictions, based on Inevitability Ratings, made in relation to the 
Usual Hindsight Bias Paradigm (―Logical Order‖/‖Outcome After Event‖ condition in lower 
right-hand corner). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Figure 2. Example of one of the 23 individual paragraphs (paired with a corresponding 
picture) used to construct the narrative. 
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Figure 3. ―Logical Order‖ progression of the narrative.  Each of the 23 paragraphs are 
presented to participants in a time-order sequence from the earliest point in time (Wednesday 
Morning) through the middle of the narrative (Friday afternoon) and finally to the end of the 
narrative immediately before the ultimate event outcome (Friday night). 
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Figure 4. Inevitability Ratings for the six conditions of the Main Study. 
 
